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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MELVIN

BRADSHAW~

Respondent,
Case

-vs.-

No. 9094

ENG8NE N. DAVIE and

MRS. ENGENE N.

DAVIE~

Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

'N.. hile in most instances the appellants' statement of
facts is substantially correct, there is no question that
it is intended to .shO\V that the respondent \vas the moving party in initiating the partnership agreement. Perusal of the testimony of both the appellant and the respondent will indicate that both parties took part in the
negotiations and that they were over a considerable period of time . Regardless of what was the moving factor in
these negotiations, on the 30th of March, 1957, a partner..
ship agreement came out of these negotiations, which
has been identified in the pleadings as p laintiff~s Exhibit
1, which i5 the only wr-itten agreement that was actually

1
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signed by both of the parties. As a result thereof, the
parties entered into said partnership and made some
limited attempt to develop the property. The trial court
had to find \Vhat property ""~as invoJved in the partnership, who \Vas responsible for the breach, and what damages should be awarded, if any. While it may have been
the appellants intention not to pay to the respondent the
S400+00 a month for his labor, at the same time the appel ..
lant 'vell knew the agreement requiring the respondent to
put in his time on the partnership~ ]eft no way for him
to make a living for his wife and family. Under these
conditions, \Vhen the $4CXl00 simply did not come, even
though demanded by the respondent! and the appellant
never refused to pay it, but simply failed and neglected
to pay it, there can be only .one conclusion, and that was
that something had to happen. The Memorandum of
Decision of the court and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I.aw take care of this fact situation and state
the courts findings pertaining to this fact situation~

.After the signing of the agreement on 30 March 1957,
upon \Vhich this partnership \vns founded~ the respondent
\Vent ahead and put in full ~imc upon the claims and
continued putting in full time on the work of the partnership, until such time as he was stopped from doing so
because of the equipment being taken a\vay from the
partnership. This equipment \Vas taken a\vay from the
partnership because of the failure of the appellant to
make the payments on same, which he had agreed to
make out of the partnership agreement of 30 March, 1957.
At ~his time there is no question that the partnership
had been breached by the appellant because he had failed
to provide the equipment that he had agreed to provide.
This failure to provide the equipment that the appellant
had agreed to provide, was not caused by the respondent
demanding money, but was caused specifically by the
factor of the lack of profits and the appel1ant could see
they were not going to get any contract and that the
m.a tter was not an econon1 i cal) feasible operation~ {See
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Report, page 104, line 20). '"'I would say that the factor
of Jack of profits and the fact that it did cost more to
strip and mine and haul th1s material to the railroad is
certainly an important thing. And it was obvious that the
cost \vas higher than what we were getting out of it. And
then there were other circumstances involved. And by
that time I knew other things about this property; and
\YC both knrHv things about it now that haven't even been
mentioned yet, that also increased the cost factor.n Based
upon the appellant's own testimony as cited above, it
becomes quite apparent that he reached a conclusion that
there was no profit in this matter and that it was his intention to break the contract. That he did so by failing
to make the payment to keep the equipment around so
that the claims could be worked~

3
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

Point I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION.

Point II
THE TRIAL COUR'T DID NOT ERR I;\ GRANTING
JUDGlVIENT AGAINST DEFENDANT~

Point

m

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF
LAW IX AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE JUDGMENT
AGAIN"ST THE DEFENDANT FOR ~11.,562.08.

Point V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE IN" ITS ACCQLTNTING ALL FUNDS RECEIVED BY THE PLAIN"TIFF FROM ANY TRANSACTIONS .
Point IV

THE TRIAL COUR1., DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT AGAII\TST THE DEFENDANT.

Point VI
TilE ACCOUNTING ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
'VAS NOT IN CONTRA VENTI ON OF THE RULES OF
DISTRIBlJTION AND ACCOUNTING OF PARTNERSHIPS.
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ARGUMENT

Point I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS ACTION.
At any time when an accounting is refused or not fur-

nished there is no question that an action may be maintained in equity for such an accounting and that this is
a ma1ter of equity jurisprudence4 In the case of Decorso
vs. Thomas et aL found in 89 Utah 160, 50 Pac. 2d 951,
\Vhich is one of the later cases decided by the Utah State
Supreme Court, it was held that the action of one partner for an accounting and for the dissolution of a co.. partnership is a proper subject matter of equity jurisprudence4 In this case the court cited 5 Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, page 5223~ Section 2363, in
which this rule was enunciated.
The cases cited by the appellant in support of his Point
I all contend that while at law it is not proper to bring
an action for accounting, that it is a proper equity action. In the case cited by appellant of Bankers Trust Co~
v. Ritert 56 Utah 525, 190 Pac~ 1113, in ""'"'hich the universal ru1e has shown on Page 7 of Appellants' Brief was set
forth, the case goes further and holds that the trial court
judgment should be affirmed and in affinning this judgment that an action for accounting may be maintained
if it appears necessary and a judgment rendered based
upon said accountlngr Also in the case of Jennings v.
Pratt~ 19 Utah 129, 56 Pac. 951, in which appellant quotes
the rule, uThe rule is doubtless well settled thatJ in the
absence of a settlement of accounts, one partner cannot
sue another at la\v upon a demand which has grown out
of a partnership transaction~ but~ where the claim of one
partner against. co-partners arises out of a transaction
r·.~hich is not properly a partnership matter, the rule does
not apply.'J In Jennings v. Pratt, the case was actually

5
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on a question ans1ng outside the partnership and the
court held that the rule was not applicable in that par..
ticular case. The general rule pertaining to this matter
is found in 58 A~ L+ R+ 623, and 168 A. L. R. 1091 and is
set forth as follows: r'The remedy of a co.. partner who
desires to recover his share of the firm assets is through
an equity action for an accounting and a settlement of
the parln ers hip affairs~~'
It appears that appellant in his Brief has attempted to
separate law and equity and has also failed to give effect
to the joinder of law and equity. Every authority cited by
the appellant in support of his position in Point I of his
Brief carried to the conclusion actually holds that the
proper remedy is to bring an action for accounting in
equity. Ce rtaini y the joinder of la\v and equity into one
court systemt as \Ve no\v have the matter, indicates that
the proper place to bring an action for an accounting is
in the present colU'ts.
To carry appellant's position in Point I to its utter absurdity produces the following result~ You can not have
an action on a partnership without an accounting. You
can not get an accounting at la,v, therefore~ if a partner
refuses to give an accountingj there is no remedy. Certainly, this is not the position our courts should hold and
certainly~ it is an utter absurdity to urge this position.
Point II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT.
In relation to Point II of the Appellant, the Court's attention is invited to the follo,ving items: (1) There must
be some great error in the report of this matter, the copy
of the Report in the possession of the respondentt where
cited at page 8 in Appel1ants~ Brie{ at page 389-392 ap-
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parent1y does not read the same as the copy of the Report
in the possession of Appellant. In the Appellants~ Brief
it is apparently questioning Dr. Davie, the defendant . In
the copy of the Report in the possession of the respondent1 this part of the testimony and the Report is the testimony oi Mr. Bradsha\\·.
(2) On page 329~ which in the Brief purports to be the
testimony of the plaintiff in the copy of Report in pos~ession of the respondent, it is the testimony of Dr. Davie~
(3) On page 12 of the Appellants' Brief where page
383-.'3.84 is cited~ as testimony of defendant it actually appears in the copy in the possession of the respondent as

the testimony of Mr. Elton. At the trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Finding No. 15,
sets out (~That the defendant did not advance any further
money for purchase of equipment for use in operation
of said mining claims and on account of the repossession
of the Caterpillar tractor and diesel tractor mentioned
and the failure of the defendant to furnish other equipment for operating said mining claims, the plaintiff
ceased "=-orl<: upon said clrt. ims on or a bout September 14,
1957/'
On page 13 of Appellants' Brief appellant cites Jordan
y~-. Madsen, 69 Utah 112, 252 Pac. 570 in support for his
contention that the p·laintiff renounced that agreement
and that said ranounccment amounted to a breach of the
albreement. This is, of course~ a sales case that has been
cited and is not a partnership case and in all probability:r
before this particular citation and the restatement of
contracts and such items as are cited therein comes into
effert~ there must be a finding of renunciation by the
plaintift At no time was there a renunciation of the
agreement by the plaintifL What the plaintiff demanded \vas a completion of the agreement and the payment
of the 1noncys due under the agreement. The court's finding as quoted above to the effect that the plaintiff ceased

7
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\vork on a specific day,. due to the defendant's failure to
provide the equipment he was supposed to provide 1Ulder
the terms of the agreement amounts to a finding that up
to that day, the plaintiff worked in conformity with the
agreement and that the breach of the agreement was by
the defendant failing to furnish this equipment.

Point m
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE DEFEXDANT FOR $11,562.08.
On page 15 of Appellants 7 Brief appellant cites Sec. 481-37~ Utah Code Annotated 1953 as authority for his
statement in his Point III that as a matter of law the
trial court erred in awarding plaintiff the judgment
against defendant for 811,562.08 based upon a partner·
ship transaction and makes the amazing statement that
Dr. Davie \vas a partner and as such had equal authority
\\.dth plaintiff to buy or return equipmennt without such
being regarded as \\Tongful conduct. Apparently the
a ppcllant takes the position that this is sufficient reason
to give a'vay va1uable property "'~ithout making any attempt to mitigate a loss or any other item thereon. Again
to carry this position to its absurdity, as Ion g as one of
the partners gave away all of the partnership property
there should be no liability to the other partner. If one
'vere going to criticize the trial co ures finding that the
assets of the partnership were $14t889~49less of the value
due to the appellant giving away and allowing the repossession of these items of machinery, one should say that
the value of the machinery as assets of the partnership
were the purchase price of the n1achinery less ~he depreciation and that this was the loss, caused by the giving
fn\·ay of this property. If one took this position it ,,·ould
0f cot~rse~ mean that this machinery was a great deal
n!ore \·aJ.uable than the 514,889.49, v~~hich the court found.

8 .·
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While the respondent does not believe that the court
erred in this finding and does not, by bringing these
figures up, \Vish to make this complaint or any implica·
tion of error, certainly this figure adds to the Joss to
the partnership occasioned by the allowing of the repossession of this equipment is very conservative~ The purchase price of the diesel tractor was $17t967.00. The diesel
tractor to pull truck with at a purchase price of $3500.0<1
The total of these items amounts to S21,476400. Had the
appellant furnished the $20,000.00 for these purposes as
he had agreed to furnish and had they been applied on
these particular items~ it is qtdte possible that the loss
instead of being in the neighborhood of $14POOO.OO was
actually in the neighborhood of $21~476 . 00. Certainly the
trial coures action in limiting this loss to the l.Olpaid
balance rather than the full purchase price was conservative and certainly the appellant is the last person in
the \Vorld that should take exception to this finding in
the trial court.
Point IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE IN ITS ACCOUNTING ALL FUNDS RECEIVED BY THE PLAIN·
TIFF FROM ANY TRANSACTIONS.

In the first p1ace the trial court did not refuse to consider the alleged "secret funds." Actually there was nothi'ng secret about them. They \Vere openly accounted
for by the respondent in his direct examination~ The
trial court simply found there was no profit from the
sale of such rna terials after allowance for expense of
labor and transportation to market~ If appellant takes
exception to this finding~ even though on page 15 of Appellants~ Brief appellant cites "It is even more astound
\vhen one considers that an unprofitable operation is a
basist in and of itself, for dissolution.~~ Apparently appeJ ..
ant takes the attitude that an unprofitable operation is

9
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grounds for dissolution and is grounds for the appellant
not bringing forth the money,. but even though it was
unprofitable that all the operation that the respondent
had should be accounted and paid . It appears to be rather
inconsistent that on page 16 of Appellants' Brief, appal~
lant takes the position ''The Partnership is entitled to the
reasonable market value of 1066 tons of the pumice material and Bradshaw is required by 1a\v to account for
itn And yet in the Report on page 104 at line 20 appelant takes the position that the lack of profit and the
cost items were the very items that caused the failure
of this partnership and caused the dissolution~ It would
seem that it all depends upon who is conducting the
operation \Vhether or not a non-profit item of this nature
should be considered. Appellant apparently failed to consider the Section of Utah Code Annotated same being
48·1 .... 18, which is quoted by appellant on page 16t ~~Every
partner must account to the partnership for any benefitt
and hold as trustee for it any profits, derived by him
without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership .or from any use by him of its
property . '' Apparently appellant has entirely missed the
gist of this Section. There is a part in this section to the
effect that there has to be profit+ When the trial court
specifically found that no profit was rea~ized from the
sa 1es of such material after allo~ring expense of lab or
and transportation to market, then cer1ainly it takes
this Point IV of appellants, Brief entirely out of cons.ideration. The Code itself~ removes this.

Point V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING
PL.AINTIFF~ JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFEXDANT .

citation to B . T~ Moran, Inc~ v. First Security.Corporation~ 82 Utah 316,24 Pac. 2d 384~ is entirely
Appellants~
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out of line in this particular case. The B. T. Moran~ Inc.
v_ First Security Corporation case has a question of a
contract for the production of goods and there is no
partnership question in it whatsoever.
Finding No. 27 is an express finding of an amount of
money O\Ved by the appellant to the respondent under
the original agreement. Finding No+ 28 of of the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law i.s an express finding that
because certain items are lost to the partnership and
assets of the partnership are reduced by the then value
of said items, this is an express finding of a reduction
of the value of the partnership. Certainly a·ny item that
re(~e_ces the assets of the partnership is harmful to all
p[u·tncrs and is certainly a proper finding of damage.
Point VI
THE ACCOlJNTING ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
WAS r\"OT IX CONTRAVENTI ON OF THE RULES OF
DISTRIBUTIOX AND ACCOUNTING OF PARTNERSHIPS.
It seems as though appellants~ position is that appellant should be reimbursed for any advances made by appellant but that it \vould be improper to reimburse therespondent for the property contributed to the partnership
by the respondent4 Can it be any more said that a cash advancement for an interest in a partnership is any more of
a contribution than the property which is the basis of the
entire partnership? By the terms of the agreemen~ neither the contribution of the appellant \Vas to be returned to
him except by profits of the partnership, nor was the
twenty-five cents per ton royalty to the amount of
$20,000.00 to be returned to the respondent except on the
profits of the partnership. Thus the court so found4 Until
there \Vere profits of said partnership in an operation
from which these items could be paid~ there was ·no duty

11
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of the partnership to pay these items to either party.
The court ha.s very properly eliminated them from con ..
sidera ti on. If a co ntrib uti on is going to be considered,
then it \vould be entirely proper to consider the contribution of the respondent and also at the time of the partnership agreement apparently both parties felt that the
property being contributed by the respondent was of
sufficient value to justify considerable expenditure in
developing samer On page 21 of Appellants~ Brief the
appellant makes the following statement, " It is obvious
and apparent that the contributions by the partners to
the partnership were so manifestly disproportionate that
a conclusion of law that the partners should be declared
equal O\vners in the remaining assets cannot possibly be
justified as a matter of law or equity.'~ If this statement
is correct} then it must be said that in entering into the
partnership agreement on an equal basis neither of the
partners had any idea of what they were doing There
is no question that certain moneys \Vere to be advanced
and paid out of the partnership profits. There is no question that certain royalties \Vere to be paid to the respondent out of partnership profits. The $5,000.00 to be paid
by the appellant to the respondent was never to be repaid
in any manner unless it \Vas to be repaid out of the partnership profits. Until all these items accrued and there
were profits, there was no provision \Vhatsoever for the
repayment of any item.. Certainly if the appellant felt
that the property was of sufficient value to justify the
investment of this type of money in this operation then
the property itself \\:~s of sufficient contribution to equal
all of the moneys that were to have been contributed by
the appellant.

l2.
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CONCLUSION
The judgn1ent of the trial court should be affirmed .

Respectfully submitted,
Patrick H. Fenton
Attorney for Respondent
13 \Vest Hoover Ave.
Cedar City~ Utah.
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